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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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[redacted]

CONGO

Adoula's moves against Gizenga appear to have strengthened the premier's domestic and international position and should enable him to intensify his efforts to end Katanga's secession. Gizenga has been dismissed as vice premier and remains under house arrest in Stanleyville.

Long anxious to rid himself of Gizenga, Adoula had been forced to temporize, not only because he believed the reduction of Tshombé took precedence but because he feared a move against Gizenga would cost him the support of the Gizengists and Lumumbists and because he had no dependable force to support any action he might take against the Stanleyville leader. The abrupt move against Gizenga on 15 January succeeded because a number of factors had changed.

Gizenga's downfall began when he accepted a post in the Adoula government, ending his claim to be the legal successor to Lumumba. Gizenga's former African and Soviet bloc supporters recognized the Adoula government, and Gizenga, in Stanleyville, was never able to reestablish his previous lines of financial and material support. By trying to promote himself as the leader of a new "umbrella" nationalist party, he challenged rival political leaders and so alienated them they were no longer opposed to a move against him. Gizenga's final mistake was to attempt an armed rebellion on 13 January when the bulk of his potential army supporters were a long way from Stanleyville.

Gizenga, however, may still be able to generate enough extremist and diplomatic support from the radical African states and the Soviet bloc to thwart or at least temper Adoula's moves. There are, moreover, reports that some of Gizenga's Stanleyville army supporters--now in northern Katanga--may try to rescue him.

Adoula [redacted] that he intended to keep Gizenga in Stanleyville several days while dossiers in his case were being prepared. The premier gave no indication of what fate he intended for Gizenga, but it seems unlikely he will let him go free.

Adoula also expressed the hope that the downfall of Gizenga would have a beneficial effect on Tshombé. Adoula is acutely aware that his position as premier is insecure and subject to "nationalist" challenge and harassment as long as the Katanga problem remains unresolved. He said one of Tshombé's Conakat party deputies had told him that Katanga now must "see the light" and rejoin the Congo. Adoula described Tshombé's maneuvers to get a constitutional adviser as more "treachery."

Adoula continues to insist that additional Congolese Army forces be brought into Katanga. He plans to come to the US (no date is yet set) and apparently intends to press the issue then.

Reports on Adoula's impending cabinet reshuffle indicate he intends to try to maintain the somewhat uneasy alliance between the "moderates" and the "nationalists." Their only real bond is a common desire to gain control of Katanga. Adoula himself lacks a solid political or

tribal base and has always moved cautiously against the "nationalists," alternating pressure and compromise. Ambassador Gullion believes Adoula is too astute to force a showdown with them, particularly before Tshombé is brought to heel. Adoula was able to move against Gizenga because he was isolated; a frontal attack on the "nationalists" now--although they are in disarray and fighting among themselves--might result in their coalescence against him. A new cabinet list drawn up as of 23 December preserved the balance between the two groups, gave more even geographical representation, and dispensed with some lesser "nationalists" and others regarded as incompetent or as political liabilities.

Adoula stated pubicly on 16 January that Gizenga's vice-premiership was "open to a member of Tshombé's party, depending on the outcome of the deliberations of the Katanga Assembly." Besides the premiership, Adoula now holds the Ministry of Defense, which has often been reported as "open" to a Tshombé follower.

The Katanga Assembly continues to stall in its deliberations on the Kitona agreement; its "foreign affairs" committee has recorded sharp reservations on three basic points, and the "political committee" is still considering the accord. In Leopoldville, the constitutional discussions are going somewhat better. In initial meetings the three-man Katanga delegation has not strenuously objected to Leopoldville's draft, and spokesmen for both sides have expressed optimism that a compromise can be worked out.

However, Mahmoud Khiari, UN chief of civil operations, told US officials in New York recently that he believes the extent of Tshombé's agreement to the Kitona accord depends on what Tshombé considers to be unavoidable, and that the pressure must be maintained on the Katangan leader. He suggested further penetration by Leopoldville troops into northern Katanga and UN control of strategic points in southern Katanga, although he said fighting was "not necessary or desirable."

[redacted] the city is calm and incidents are diminishing. A prisoner exchange between the UN and Katanga was made on 16 January. UN officials nevertheless are disturbed by continuing reports of Katangan recruitment of mercenaries and procurement of military equipment. [redacted] he intends to "have a serious talk" with Tshombé soon regarding the mercenary problem. [redacted]

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